Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites by Akerman, Anders et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autocracies and Development in a 
Global Economy: 
A Tale of Two Elites 
 
Anders Akerman 
Anna Larsson Seim 
Alireza Naghavi 
 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE N°775 
 
 
Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy:
A Tale of Two Elites
Anders Akermany Anna Larsson Seimz Alireza Naghavix
January 2013
Abstract
This paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elitesendowments shape
long-run performance in an economy with imperfect political institutions. In a capital-scarce
economy, an autocrat catering to the needs of landowners favours openness to trade at an early
stage of development, while an autocrat complying with the preferences of capitalists chooses to
shelter the economy from trade. The trade regime interacts with economic institutions, and with
policies on capital mobility, to govern capital accumulation. A landed autocrat neglects to im-
prove institutions and blocks foreign capital to maximize extractable rents, leading the economy
towards stagnation. By contrast, a capitalist autocrat strengthens institutions, which promotes
manufacturing TFP growth, gradually shifts the comparative advantage towards manufacturing
and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors. Allowing for trade and foreign capital
inows are thus complementary policies that provide an environment of growth and development
in the capital autocracy.
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1 Introduction
Data from the post World-War II era of globalization reveal a striking variation in the growth
performance of autocratic countries: dictatorships tend to either excel or fall behind. Openness
to trade appears to have been conducive to growth in some autocracies but not in others. At the
lower end of the spectrum of autocracies are some of the worlds poorest performing economies
and at the upper end are the miraculous East Asian Tiger Economies who have doubled their
income in a decade or less since the beginning of the 1960s. How can we explain these di¤erences
in performance?
In this paper we highlight an empirical feature that has been somewhat overlooked in the
existing literature: the fact that the endowments of the political elites, and therefore the preferences
of the ruling autocrats, di¤er across countries. We model an economy with imperfect political
institutions and study how the trade regime interacts with policies a¤ecting the institutional quality
and international capital mobility.1 We argue that the interplay between these elements is crucial
for growth and development.
A growing strand of literature emphasizes how political and economic institutions shape long-
run performance and helps us understand some of the reasons autocracies di¤er, see for instance
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005a) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for overviews.2 The
relationship between openness and institutions has become subject to intensive research only in
recent years and the empirical results are mixed. Free trade can either lead to stronger institutions
as in Ades and Di Tella (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005b), Rodrik, Subramanian
and Trebbi (2004) and Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), or to institutional deterioration as in Treisman
(2003) and Tavares (2007). As argued by Stefanadis (2010), the empirical literature is ahead
of theory in this area and more theoretical work is needed to deepen our understanding of the
interaction between globalization and institutional quality.
While proponents of trade argue that economic integration is conducive to stronger institutions,
a series of recent papers point out that this is not always the case. Johnson, Ostry, and Subramanian
(2007) suggest that if returns from trade fall into the hands of a small elite, the concentration of
power that may follow can worsen institutions. Bardhan (2010) conrms that the trade expansion
1 The notion that trade in goods and capital movements interact with each other, and can be either complements
or substitutes, is the subject of a large literature comprising Markusen (1983), Jones and Neary (1984), Markusen
and Svensson (1985), Wong (1986), Jones (1989), and Neary (1995).
2 Within this literature, examples of imperfect political institutions include expropriation (Segura-Cayuela, 2006;
Stefanadis, 2010), inequality in land ownership (Galor, Moav and Vollrath, 2009; Falkinger and Grossman, 2013) and
rent-seeking (Levchenko, 2007; Cervellati, Naghavi and Toubal, 2013).
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in natural resource intensive products has strengthened the political power of large exporters who
subsequently have raised barriers to entry and promoted oligarchic institutions. Levchenko (2012)
adds that trade improves the institutional quality if it reduces the rents from dysfunctional institu-
tions, but brings institutional deterioration in the opposite case. Several recent theoretical papers
have demonstrated the negative e¤ect of autocracies opening to trade on domestic economic insti-
tutions such as investment in schooling (Falkinger and Grossman, 2005), the investment climate
(Do and Levchenko, 2009), property rights (Stefanadis, 2010), and technology adoption (Cervellati,
Naghavi and Toubal, 2013). We contribute to this literature by arguing that the e¤ects of trade on
institutional quality are contingent on the nature of the political elites.
Consistent with the aforementioned literature, we show that if the political elites are landowners
in a capital-scarce economy, openness to trade creates an environment of institutional neglect and
stagnation. However, if the political elites are instead capitalists, the autocrat gradually shifts
the comparative advantage towards manufacturing by improving the institutional quality, which
eventually provides an incentive to open up to trade and allow for foreign capital inows. We also
add to the existing literature by stressing that the complementarity of policies on trade and capital
mobility is crucial for the success of autocratic economies and show that such complementarities
arise in the capitalist autocracy.
We build a specic-factor trade model where the nature of the political elites and the com-
parative advantage determine the long-term development of an economy with imperfect political
institutions.3 The economy consists of an agricultural sector and a manufacturing sector. The
political elites may hold either land or capital and we shall henceforth refer to these economies
as land and capital autocracies, respectively. The autocrats policy space comprises the following
elements: (i) the ability to allow for international trade in goods; (ii) the ability to strengthen
economic institutions that promote manufacturing TFP growth; and (iii) the ability to allow for
the inow of foreign capital.
We consider a setting where each economy is characterized by an initial comparative disad-
vantage in manufacturing and show that the two di¤erent types of autocracies react di¤erently to
globalization. A landed autocrat prefers to open up to trade at an early stage of development,
which creates an environment where institutional quality is neglected. This prediction is consistent
with developments in Argentina after the Perónist populist and protectionist era, where the mili-
3 For seminal contributions to the class of specic-factor models see Jones (1971), Samuelson (1971), Mussa (1974)
and Neary (1978).
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tary government, mainly controlled by the agricultural elites, took power in 1976 and brought the
economy back to free trade (Brambilla, Galiani, and Porto, 2010).
By contrast, a capitalist autocrat initially shelters the economy from global markets while
promoting institutional quality. Rodrik (1994) stresses that an important factor behind the out-
standing performances of South Korea and Taiwan was indeed that governments managed to raise
the returns to private investments, thereby increasing the demand for imported capital goods.
In line with this argument, we show that the endowments of the political elites govern whether
openness to trade and to foreign capital inows are complementary policies. This is the case in
a capitalist autocracy so that the benets of allowing for foreign capital inows are realized only
once the economy is open to trade. This result is consistent with actual developments in some of
the growth-miracle economies, such as Taiwan and South Korea, where the entrepreneurial elites
allowed for large-scale capital inows only after opening up to trade in the 1970s.4 In an autocracy
where the elites are landowners, no such complementarities exist.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses
the equilibrium under di¤erent trade regimes. Section 4 introduces international capital mobility.
Section 5 presents the political-economy layer of the model and derives analytical results on optimal
policies. The results from a numerical simulation of the model are presented in Section 6. The
results are related to actual historical accounts in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a small, potentially open economy. The economy consists of two sectors denoted j = A;M
for agriculture and manufacturing. Each sector produces a sector-specic good that is tradable in
the world market. There are three groups of households that di¤er in their initial endowments and
supply either land, capital or labour to rms. We assume that each time period, denoted t, is one
generation so that households and policy makers have one-period lives. Owners of the factors of
production have warm-glow preferences and leave bequests to their o¤spring.5
We vary the assumption on the nature of the political elites and assume that they are either
landowners or capitalists. The autocrat caters to the needs of the elites and may thus be either
4 Source: Statistics on Approved Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment by Area, the Investment Commission,
Ministry of Economic A¤airs, Taiwan.
5 The warm-glow preference structure enables us to characterize the equilibrium in each period. The bequests
ensure that there is a dynamic link between periods and that the capital stock is growing over time.
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landed or capitalist in nature.6 The autocrat governs the institutional quality and makes decisions
on whether or not to allow for international trade in goods and foreign capital inows.
We rst treat institutions and regimes as exogenously given and focus on solving the economic
model in Sections 2-4. Since we are ultimately interested in how the elites choose policies, we put
particular emphasis on the real returns to capital and land under di¤erent regimes in these Sections.
The preferences and optimal choices of the ruling autocrats are then analysed in Section 5.
2.1 Production
The agricultural and manufacturing sectors di¤er in terms of technology and the factors employed
in production. Labour is the only input used in both technologies and is perfectly mobile across
the two sectors so that the labour supply is innitely elastic.
The agricultural sector uses land (X) and labour (L) to produce the agricultural good. Letting
YA denote the output of the agricultural good:
YAt = X

t L
1 
At (1)
where  2 (0; 1) and LAt denotes the labour employed in the sector.
The manufacturing sector uses capital (K) and labour to produce the manufacturing good:
YMt = AMtK

t L
1 
Mt (2)
where AMt denotes total factor productivity in the manufacturing sector and LMt refers to the
labour employed in the sector.7 Kt = AKtKDt + KFt is the total e¤ective capital stock in the
economy and comprises domestic and foreign capital, KDt and KFt, respectively. A key feature of
the model is an assumption that domestic capital is less productive than foreign capital and we let
the parameter AKt denote the relative productivity of domestic capital. At a later stage, we will
model AKt as a function of KFt, thereby assuming that the presence of foreign, more productive
capital will have positive spill-over e¤ects on domestic capital. In equilibrium the presence of such
capital will hinge on domestic returns to capital being su¢ ciently high as well as the incumbent
autocrat allowing for such capital inows. For now, however, we treat AKt as a parameter, derive
equilibrium expressions that hold for KFt  0; and return to this issue in Section 4.
6 The possibility that autocrats may be heterogeneous and have di¤erent objectives is also present in Shen (2007),
Paltseva (2008) and Larsson Seim and Parente (2012). However, these papers do not take into account that the
endowments of the political elites may be country-specic.
7 We assume labour intensity, 1  , to be the same in both sectors. The assumption is made for simplicity and
is of minor importance: sectoral di¤erences in terms of labours share in production are not related to the dynamics
of interest in our model.
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While total factor productivity is assumed to be constant and normalized to one in the agricul-
tural sector, TFP in the manufacturing sector grows at some exogenous rate t > 0: However, the
evolution of manufacturing TFP is also governed by policy. Specically, AMt evolves according to:
AMt = (1 + Mtt)AMt 1 (3)
where Mt 2 [0; 1] is a policy variable. The construct allows us to think of Mt as a broad measure of
the quality of institutions capturing the extent to which policy makers seek to promote technological
progress. In an environment with extremely strong institutions, i.e. where policies are conducive to
technology adoption, Mt = 1 so that manufacturing TFP grows at its full potential. Conversely,
in an economy with extremely weak institutions, i.e. where the policy maker seeks to completely
block the adoption of new technologies, Mt = 0 so that there is no technological progress and
manufacturing TFP stagnates.
2.2 Endowments, Preferences and Income
The population consists of capitalists, indexed K, landowners, indexed X, and workers, indexed
L. Letting NK ; NX and L denote the measure of each group, the total population at time t is
Nt = NKt+NXt+Lt. We assume a stationary population normalized to one, as population growth
is of no importance for the dynamics of interest in our setting. Landowners hold one unit of land
which they rent to rms in the agricultural sector, while capitalists rent their capital to rms in
the manufacturing sector.
Owners of the factors of production derive utility from consumption and from leaving bequests
to their children and the utility function assumes the following form:
U(Ct; Bht) = C

t B
1 
ht
for h = K;X where Ct = CAtC
1 
Mt and the maximization is subject to constraints that are
household-specic. The elite households leave bequests according to their endowments. Land and
capital di¤er in that land does not depreciate while capital depreciates fully from one generation
to another. This means that landowners simply bequeath their land endowments to their children
while capitalists convert a share of their income to bequests in terms of an investment good. Be-
quests are thus a part of the budget restriction of the capitalists but not of the landowners. The
details of the householdsmaximization problems are given in Appendix A1.
The income of a domestic capitalist is:
IKt = iDtkt; (4)
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where iDt denotes returns to domestic capital and kt  KDt=NKt is the capital endowment of each
capitalist. The income of a landowner is:
IXt = iXt; (5)
where iXt denotes returns to land. Finally, workersincome amounts to their wages:
ILjt = wjt; (6)
where j = A;M represents the sector of employment.
We let PAt; PMt and PBt denote the prices of agricultural goods, manufacturing goods and
bequests, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that bequests are made in terms of manufacturing
goods, which implies PBt = PMt:We treat the manufacturing sector as the numéraire sector and set
PMt to unity. PAt therefore denotes the relative price of agricultural goods in terms of manufacturing
goods.
Under these assumptions, the indirect utility functions of the elite households are:
VKt = K
IKt
PAt
; (7)
VXt = X
IXt
P At
; (8)
where K  () ( (1  ))(1 ) (1  )(1 ) and X   (1  )(1 ).
Since workers do not own any resources other than time, they leave no bequests but consume
their entire income. They thus choose consumption baskets in the same way as the landowners.
Finally, we note that dening the general price level as the nominal income needed to buy one
unit of the optimal basket of consumption and bequests, the price indices facing each group are
PKt = P

At and PXt = PLt = P

At.
3 Equilibrium under Di¤erent Trade Regimes
This section solves for the equilibrium prices of goods, factor allocations, returns and output levels in
the two sectors under di¤erent trade regimes. We start by discussing general equilibrium conditions
in Section 3.1, and proceed by discussing the equilibria in closed and open economies in Sections
3.2 and 3.3, respectively.
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3.1 General
From the prot-maximization problems of rms it follows that returns to capital, land and labour
are given by:
iKt =
@YMt
@Kt
= (1 + Mtt)AMt 1K
 1
t L
1 
Mt ; (9)
iXt = PAt
@YAt
@Xt
= PAtX
 1
t L
1 
At (10)
wMt =
@YMt
@LMt
= (1  )(1 + Mtt)AMt 1Kt L Mt (11)
wAt = PAt
@YAt
@LAt
= PAt(1  )Xt L At (12)
Equation (9) denes returns to e¤ective capital Kt: Since domestic and foreign capital di¤er in
productivity, returns to each type of capital will di¤er accordingly. The manufacturing rms
optimal choices of each type of capital input, imply that the returns to domestic and foreign
capital, respectively, are given by:
iDt =
@YMt
@KDt
= AKtiKt (13)
iFt =
@YMt
@KFt
= iKt (14)
where iKt is given by (9).
Regardless of the trade regime, under full employment and inelastic labour supply, employment
in the two sectors adds up to the total labour supply:
Lt = LAt + LMt. (15)
Labour can move freely between the two sectors, equalising the wage across sector so that wt =
wAt = wMt: Equations (11) and (12) imply :
PAt = (1 + Mtt)AMt 1

Kt
Xt
LAt
LMt

(16)
3.2 Closed Economy
In autarky, prices are endogenously determined in the domestic market. Aggregating the demand
functions over the population yields aggregate demand for agricultural goods:
YAt =

PCAt
(wtLt + rXtXt + rKtKt) ; (17)
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The corresponding expression in the manufacturing sector is:
YMt = (1  ) (wtLt + rXtXt + rKtKt) + (1  ) rKtKt; (18)
where the second term on the right-hand-side is the demand for manufacturing goods used for
bequests.
In a closed economy, the relative price of agricultural goods is directly implied by the condition
for wage equality (16). The expression shows that the relative price of agricultural goods is pro-
portional to manufacturing TFP, which is increasing in institutional quality. Agricultural goods
are also relatively more expensive if land is scarce relative to capital and if there is a high share of
labour employed in agriculture.
Combining (9), (16), (17) and (18) the relative labour allocation is given by:
LAt
LMt
=

1   (1   (1  )) . (19)
As is standard in specic-factor models, the relative labour allocation across sectors is independent
of factor endowments in autarky. This obtains since prices adjust in proportion to the labour share
in the two sectors. The term =1    captures the relative demand for agricultural goods and is
positively related to the share of labour in agriculture. A lower  indicates lower marginal returns
to capital, and hence less resources to spend on bequests. Since bequests are made in terms of
manufacturing goods, the demand for such goods decreases, as does LMt. Stronger preferences for
bequests, captured by an increase in (1 ), reects more expenditure on bequests and therefore a
higher demand for manufacturing goods and labour in that sector. If bequests were not to matter,
so that  = 1, the allocation of labour would be a function of the relative preferences for agricultural
versus manufacturing goods as in the standard model.
Equation (19) allows us to rewrite the price equation (16) as:
PAt = (1 + Mtt)AMt 1


1   (1   (1  ))
Kt
Xt

. (20)
By using the price indices derived in Section 2.2. we may dene the real returns to domestic capital
and land, respectively, as rDt  AKtiKt=PAt and rXt  iXt=P At. By using (9), (10), (15) and (20),
we may derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 In autarky, the real returns to the domestic factors of production are:
rDt =  [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1  AKtX

t L
1 
t
K
1 (1 )
t
;
rXt =  [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1  K
(1 )
t L
1 
t
X1 t
;
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where   (1+

1  (1 (1 )))
 (1 )
( 1  (1 (1 )))
 and   (

1  (1 (1 )))
1 
(1+ 1  (1 (1 )))
1  .
The Lemma suggests that the institutional quality, Mt, is important for the returns to both
factors of production, but through separate channels. Stronger institutions that spur manufacturing
TFP raise the return to capital by a¤ecting capitals marginal productivity. Land returns are also
increasing in institutional quality, but through a decrease in the relative price of manufacturing.
Moreover, relative abundance of capital with respect to land increases (decreases) returns to land
(capital), while a larger labour stock increases the returns to both factors in their specic sectors.
3.3 Open Economy
In an open economy, the relative price of agricultural goods to manufactures is exogenously given by
the world relative price, P At. Imposing this condition on (16) implies that relative labour allocation
across sectors is given by:
LAt
LMt
=

(1 + Mtt)AMt 1
P At
 1= Xt
Kt
(21)
Under free trade in goods, the allocation of labour between the two sectors is inuenced by factor
endowments since the prices are xed and cannot counterbalance them as they do in autarky. The
relative allocation of labour in manufacturing is increasing in the quality of economic institutions,
the e¤ective capital stock and the world relative price of manufacturing goods.
In analogy to the closed economy, real returns in the open economy are dened as rDt 
AKtiKt=P

At and rXt  iXt=P At : Using (9), (10), (15) and (21), real returns in the open economy
may be summarized as follows.
Lemma 2 Under free trade in goods the real returns to the domestic factors of production are:
rDt =
 [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=AKt
P At
"
Lt
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
#1 
rXt = P
(1 )=
At
"
Lt
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
#1 
The Lemma provides interesting insights on the e¤ects of institutional quality, related to the sectoral
allocation of labour under free trade. Capitalists benet from strong institutions as this is conducive
to technological progress and raises the marginal productivity of capital. By contrast, stronger
economic institutions hurt landowners by drawing labour out of agriculture, thereby decreasing
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the marginal productivity of land. In an open economy, landowners can satisfy their demand for
manufacturing goods through imports, and internal prices are no longer relevant. Clearly, a higher
world price of agricultural goods benets landowners and translates into a loss for capitalists.
4 Introducing International Capital Mobility
We next introduce the possibility that the autocrat may allow foreign, more productive, capital to
ow into the country. We assume that returns generated from foreign capital, KFt, are measured in
terms of domestic goods and transferred back to the country of origin. The real returns to foreign
capital are therefore rFt  iFt= (PAt) where iFt is given by (14) and PAt is given by (16) in a
closed economy but equal to P At in an open economy. We further let r

t denote the real rate of
return that can be obtained on international capital markets. Finally, we assume that AKt is a
measure of the degree of spillovers generated by foreign capital inows so that AKt = AKt(KFt),
where A
0
Kt(KFt) > 0. We start by discussing the equilibrium implications for the closed economy
in Section 4.1 and proceed with the open economy in Section 4.2.
4.1 Closed Economy
The stock of foreign capital, KFt, is governed by the potential returns it will generate in the country.
Using (14) and Lemma 1, the real returns to foreign capital in autarky are:
rFt =  [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1  L
1 
t X

t
(AKt(KFt)KDt +KFt)1 (1 )
. (22)
Since A
0
Kt(KFt) > 0, it follows directly that @rFt=@KFt < 0.
The opportunity cost for foreign investors is given by the returns to capital that prevail on the
international market, rt . Foreign capital enters the country only if returns are at least as high as
rt . Since @rFt=@KFt < 0, it is su¢ cient to examine whether the latent return to the rst unit
of foreign capital entering the country, erFt  rFtjKFt = 0, satises this condition. Given thaterFt > rt , foreign capital will ow into the country until rFt = rt . In equilibrium, there are thus
no arbitrage opportunities from investing in a particular country. Using (22) we can formulate the
following Lemma.
Lemma 3 In a closed economy where the following condition holds:
erFt =  [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]1  L1 t Xt(AKt(0)KDt)1 (1 ) > rt ;
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the equilibrium level of foreign capital satises rFt = rt and is given by
KFt = max

0;
h
 [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1  L1 t X

t i
 1
t
i 1
1 (1 )  AKt (KFt)KDt

. (23)
In the expression for latent returns, AKt(0) is the lower-bound productivity of domestic capital that
obtains in the absence of foreign capital. Since we assume that domestic capital is less productive
than foreign capital we let AKt(0) be less than unity.
The Lemma suggests that countries promoting technological progress by maintaining strong
economic institutions attract more capital, since the rate of return is higher in these countries.
Countries with a large relative endowment of e¤ective domestic capital AKtKDt, however, are
characterized by lower returns to capital and are therefore less attractive to foreign investors. Note
that abundance in land attracts foreign capital in a closed economy through an increase in the
relative price of manufacturing goods.
4.2 Open Economy
The open economy may be treated analogously. We use (14), Lemma 2 and PAt = P At to obtain:
rFt =
 [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=
P At
"
Lt
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
#1 
. (24)
The expression conrms that real returns to foreign capital are decreasing in the stock of foreign
capital also in the open economy, so that @rFt=@KFt < 0: As before, we may derive a latent return
to the rst unit of capital entering the economy and prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 In an open economy where the following condition holds:
erFt =  [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]1=
P At
"
Lt
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=AKt(0)KDt
#1 
> rt ;
the equilibrium level of foreign capital satises rFt = rt and is given by
KFt = max
(
0;

(1 + Mtt)AMt 1
P At i

t
1=(1 )
Lt  

P At
(1 + Mtt)AMt 1
1=
Xt  AKt (KFt)KDt
)
.
(25)
The result suggests that the likelihood of a positive inow of capital in an open economy is increasing
in the quality of institutions. Although stronger institutions increase the demand for labour in the
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economy, they also increase returns to capital by enabling technological progress and one may show
that the latter e¤ect always dominates. A smaller stock of e¤ective domestic capital attracts foreign
investors also in an open economy. In an open economy, the e¤ect of more land is the opposite to
that under autarky: instead of lowering prices, an increase in land lowers the marginal returns to
capital by drawing workers out of manufacturing.
5 Political Economy
Having identied the equilibrium of the model for given economic institutions and trade and capital
regimes, we now add a political layer and endogenize the autocratspolicy choices.8 As discussed
in Section 2, we consider two types of economies that di¤er only with respect to the endowments
of the elites, who may hold either land or capital. As the incumbent autocrat caters to the needs
of the elites, their endowments will govern the leadersobjectives. If the elites are endowed with
land, we refer to their leader as a landed autocrat and if the elites are endowed with capital, we
refer to their leader as a capitalist autocrat.
The autocrat has three policy instruments at his disposal. He can impose barriers to technology
adoption by letting Mt < 1 according to (3), he can choose to prohibit trade and he can choose
to prohibit foreign capital inows. For convenience, we dene the following policy variables:
Ot =

1 if there are no barriers to trade (open economy)
0 otherwise
Ft =

1 if there are no barriers to foreign capital inows
0 otherwise
The autocrat thus chooses a policy vector, t = (Ot; Ft; Mt) to maximize the indirect utility of
the elites. The optimal policy of autocrat a therefore satises:
at = argmaxVat(at)
where Vat is given by (7) and (8) for a = K;X; respectively. Since the elitesendowments, kDt
and xt, are given in each period, what matters to the autocrat is the real returns to factors of
production.
8 As discussed in the introduction, imperfect political institutions have been modelled inter alia as rent seeking
and expropriation in the previous literature. Here we assume that rents from the sector that is of no interest to the
elites cannot be expropriated by the autocrat. This is plausible if the ruler needs to maintain order in the society in
order to stay in power and avoid a revolution.
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We next examine the optimal choices of the two types of autocrats. Due to the complexity of the
model, studying the simultaneous interaction between all three policies is analytically intractable.
To gain some intuition, however, we next derive some analytical results on the choice of one policy
variable holding the other two constant. To this end, we study the interaction between trade
and economic institutions in Section 5.1 and proceed by analysing the relationship between trade
and foreign capital inows for each type of autocracy in Section 5.2. Numerical results on the
simultaneous interaction between all three policy instruments are then presented in Section 6.
5.1 Trade and Economic Institutions
We start by looking at the autocratschoices of whether or not to open the economy to interna-
tional trade. A capitalist autocrat prefers free trade if VKt (1; Ft; Mt) > VKt (0; Ft; Mt). Using
Lemmas 1 and 2, this inequality is satised when:
1h
P
1=
At Xt
i
h
[(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
i1 (1 )
h
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
i1  >  . (26)
The result allows us to draw some important conclusions. First, stronger economic institutions
in terms of Mt, favouring technological progress, increase the capitalist autocrats willingness to
engage in trade by making manufacturing rms more competitive. In addition, more e¤ective
capital in the form of domestic capital growth, the inow of foreign capital, or an increase in the
productivity of capital, makes a capitalist autocrat more positive towards free trade for reasons of
comparative advantage. The world relative price of manufacturing goods, inversely measured by
P
1=
At , also increases the willingness of a capitalist to engage in trade.
For a landed autocrat, the condition is instead VXt (1; Ft; Mt) > VXt (0; Ft; Mt). Lemmas
1 and 2 imply that this obtains when:h
P
1=
At Xt
i1 
h
[(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
i(1 ) h
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=Kt
i1  >  (27)
The condition suggests that a landed autocrat is more inclined to trade when economic institutions
are weak, the economy is relatively well-endowed with land (for reasons of comparative advantage)
and when the world relative price of agricultural goods is high. We may formulate the following
proposition.
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Proposition 1 Given that institutions are su¢ ciently weak, an economy with a comparative dis-
advantage in manufacturing, i.e. with Kt=Xt low enough to generate PAt < P At, is opened up to
trade if ruled by a land autocrat, but remains closed under a capital autocrat.
Proof. Condition (26) does not hold for a su¢ ciently low level of Kt since Kt enters additively
in the denominator and with a smaller exponent than in the numerator. A low level of Kt is
tantamount to a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing. By contrast, condition (27) does
hold for a su¢ ciently low Kt since Kt appears only in the denominator.
The result follows from the fact that owners of a relatively abundant factor, in this case land, prefer
free trade to autarky since it raises their real income by inducing a favourable change in relative
prices. The opposite holds for owners of relatively scarce factors, in this case capital.
Having established how the autocrats choose trade regime for a given level of Mt, we next
investigate how they choose institutions for a given trade regime Ot. Equation (7) and Lemmas 1
and 2 reveal that, regardless of the trade regime, it is optimal for a capitalist autocrat to promote
economic institutions, since
@VKt(0; Ft; Mt)
@Mt
> 0;
@VKt(1; Ft; Mt)
@Mt
> 0:
Intuitively, stronger institutions are conducive to technological progress in the manufacturing sector,
which raises the marginal productivity of capital and therefore raises returns to domestic capitalists.
Turning to the choice of the landed autocrat, equation (8) and Lemmas 1 and 2 imply:
@VXt(0; Ft; Mt)
@Mt
> 0;
@VXt(1; Ft; Mt)
@Mt
< 0
A landed autocrat thus prefers strong institutions in autarky, but weak institutions when the
economy is open to trade. Intuitively, strong institutions reduce the relative price of manufacturing
goods in a closed economy, which benets the landed elites by raising returns to land. In an open
economy, no such price e¤ect can arise since the relative price is determined in the world market.
In a globalized setting, weaker institutions reduce manufacturing TFP growth and therefore the
marginal productivity of labour employed in that sector. This leaves more workers in agriculture,
which spurs returns to land and benets landowners. Interestingly, this suggests that globalization
changes the incentives of the landed autocrat in a way that is not benecial for industrial growth.
Proposition 2 A capital autocrat always seeks to strengthen economic institutions regardless of
whether the country is closed or open to trade. A landed autocrat supports institutions conducive
to technology adoption in autarky but blocks institutional improvements in an open economy.
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Proof. The results follow trivially from di¤erentiating the returns in Lemmas 1 and 2 with respect
to Mt:
Note that since the share of workers employed in agriculture is xed in a closed economy, the rise in
the relative price of agriculture benets the landed elites by raising their real income. Consequently,
a land autocrat has incentives to improve economic institutions that promote technology adoption
under autarky. In an open economy, however, relative prices do not change. Workers, therefore,
respond to changes in economic institutions by moving into the sector that pays the highest wages.
A landed autocrat is therefore enticed into blocking technological improvements as higher growth in
manufacturing TFP would cause migration from agriculture to manufacturing The key di¤erence
between the closed and open setting is that, in autarky, relative prices neutralize any changes
in productivity across sectors and this leaves the allocation of labour unchanged. In an open
economy, however, relative prices are xed, which makes the allocation of labour sensitive to the
relative performance of the two sectors, giving the ruling autocrat stronger incentives to improve
the relative performance of the sector in which the elitesprimary factor is employed.
5.2 Trade and Foreign Capital Inows
We now turn to the autocratsdecisions on whether or not to allow for the inow of foreign capital
under di¤erent trade regimes. On the entry of foreign capital, what matters is not only how the
autocrat sets Ft, but also whether returns are such that the country is able to attract foreign
capital. This implies that Ft and Mt interact in important ways. In this section, we consider the
choice of Ft for a given trade regime and for given institutions.
Starting with the optimal policies of the capitalist autocrat, Lemma 1 shows that the e¤ect of
foreign capital on the returns to domestic capital is ambiguous in a closed economy. Foreign capital
enters the denominator of domestic returns since it lowers the marginal productivity of domestic
capital due to diminishing returns. However, foreign capital also enters the numerator through its
technological spillovers on domestic capital, captured by AKt(KFt). A capitalist autocrat thus only
favours capital inows if the gains from the productivity spillovers dominate the losses from the
direct reduction in the marginal productivity of capital, i.e.
dVKt
dKFt
> 0 if
@VKt
@AKt
@AKt
@KFt
>
@VKt
@KFt
.
Di¤erentiating (7) with respect to KFt, using Lemmas 1 and 2, we nd that
dVKt(0; Ft; Mt)
dKFt
> 0 if  t > (1   (1  ))   t(0; Ft; Mt); (28)
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where  t  KDtA0Kt (0) = (1 +KDtA0Kt (0)) 2 [0; 1] is an index of potential spillovers from foreign
capital at the point where no foreign investment has yet taken place in the country. In the open
economy, the condition becomes:
dVKt(1; Ft; Mt)
dKFt
> 0
if  t > (1  )
AKt(0)KDt [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=
P
1=
At Xt + [(1 + Mtt)AMt 1]
1=AKt(0)KDt
   t(1; Ft; Mt); (29)
In (29), it is easy to see that  t(1; Ft; Mt) < 1 , and since 1  < (1   (1  )) ; (28) and
(29) imply:
 t(0; Ft; Mt) >  t(1; Ft; Mt) (30)
In other words, the threshold spillovers above which the capitalist autocrat chooses to allow the
inow of foreign capital are higher in a closed economy than in an open economy. All else equal,
the capital autocrat is therefore more in favour of foreign capital inows in an open economy than
in a closed economy. Thus, as long as spillovers are su¢ ciently large to satisfy (29), he chooses to
allow capital mobility when open to trade but not in autarky.9 We conclude that allowing for trade
and capital mobility are complementary policies in a capital autocracy.
The choice of the landed autocrat is more straightforward. Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that a landed
autocrat is in favour of the entry of foreign capital in a closed economy, but against it in an open
economy:
dVXt(0; Ft; Mt)
dKFt
> 0,
dVXt(1; Ft; Mt)
dKFt
< 0. (31)
The landed autocrat is thus more in favour of foreign capital inows in a closed economy than in an
open economy and we conclude that allowing for trade and capital mobility are substitute policies
in a land autocracy.10 We may formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Allowing for international trade and for the inow of foreign capital are comple-
mentary policies in a capital autocracy but substitute policies in a land autocracy.
Proof. The result for the capital autocracy follows from (28) and (29). The result for the land
autocracy follows from di¤erentiating (8) with respect to KFt using the returns in Lemmas 1 and
2.
9 Note that very high levels of  t, at which the landed autocrat would favour capital inows also in autarky, are
not relevant for our analysis. In such cases excessive spillovers discourage foreign investors, as can be seen from AKt
appearing in the denominator of the latent returns to foreign capital and entering negatively in the equilibrium level
of foreign capital in Lemmas 3 and 4.
10 Moreover, since we know from Proposition 1 that the landed autocrat maintains weak institutions when open
to trade, foreign investors would be less likely to invest in the country, even if they were allowed to do so.
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The mechanism that causes trade and capital inows to be substitutes in a land autocracy is
closely linked to the result in Proposition 2. In a closed economy, a larger capital stock (and
more e¢ cient domestic capital) raises the relative price of agricultural goods and hence the real
income of a landowner. Under free trade, however, a larger capital stock will a¤ect the sectoral
allocation of workers to the disadvantage of landowners. For a capital autocracy, the problem is
very di¤erent. The inow of foreign capital potentially has three e¤ects on domestic capitalists
and these e¤ects go in opposite directions as far as the real returns to capital are concerned. The
positive e¤ect of foreign capital is that it causes technological spillovers that raise the productivity
of domestic capital. The two negative e¤ects are, rst, that, for a given allocation of labour, more
capital implies more capital per worker in the manufacturing sector and this lowers the marginal
productivity of all capital. Second, the foreign capital increases the supply and lowers the relative
price of manufacturing goods. In autarky, all three e¤ects are present. Under free trade, however,
the third e¤ect disappears since relative prices are xed. Therefore, the capitalist autocrat is more
likely to favour capital inows under free trade than under autarky.
6 Numerical Simulation
To illustrate the simultaneous interaction between institutional quality, goods trade and the inow
of foreign capital, we next display numerical solutions to the model. We solve for the optimal
policies in each period and simulate the economy over time. We start out in a state where the
economy holds a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing and study each autocrats decision
to open up to trade and allow for foreign capital inows. When possible, we try to match key
statistics for the South Korean economy in parameterizing the model and therefore think of the
capital autocracy as a crude representation of this economy. By studying the development of the
land autocracy for the same set of parameters, we may think of the results for the land autocracy
as representing an interesting counterfactual, namely how South Korea would have evolved if its
leaders had catered to the preferences of its landowners rather than to those of its capitalists.
6.1 Parameters
In parameterizing the model, we set the capital share in manufacturing, and thus the land share
in agriculture, to match the average labour share of :703 reported for the South Korean economy
over the period 1966-90 by Young (1995), and let  = :297: In choosing the consumption share of
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income, , we note that bequests correspond to domestic investments in our setting. We thus set
 to match the :081 investment share of GDP in South Korea in 1960, obtained from the Penn
World Tables 7.1, and let  = :919: We have no prior on how to set the agricultural share of
consumption but let  = :10 in the benchmark simulation. In modelling the growth process of
manufacturing TFP, we follow Hansen and Prescott (2004) in choosing an average annual growth
rate of 1:4 per cent. Since one model period spans one generation, we convert these annual rates
to 30-year equivalents and let  = :518:11
We also need estimates of the population shares. To the best of our knowledge, direct estimates
of the share of landowners and capitalists in South Korea are not available, but since these house-
holds represent the potential elites, they are bound to be a small number. In the benchmark we
want to make the two groups of elites equally inuential in their respective economies and therefore
set NX = NK = :05. Since the population is normalized to one, this implies L = :90: As stated
in the theoretical section, each landowner holds one unit of land, which implies that the total land
endowment in the economy is Xt = NX = :05:
We have no prior on how to set the international relative price of agricultural goods but since we
want to mimic South Koreas transition from a closed to an open economy, we make sure that the
economy starts out with a comparative disadvantage in manufacturing by ensuring that P A < PA0,
and let P A = 1: The nal set of parameters are related to the inow of foreign capital. We choose
a simple, linear relation between KF and AK and assume:
AK = 1 + 2KFt;
where 1 2 (0; 1) and 2 > 0: Since we want domestic capital to be less productive than foreign
capital when KFt = 0 and spillovers from foreign capital to be positive, we let 1 = :80 and
2 = 1:5. We set the international real interest rate such that foreign investors would like to invest
in the capital autocracy, given the opportunity to do so, and let r = 6.
In addition to these fundamental parameters, a set of initial conditions for the capital endow-
ment and manufacturing TFP need to be specied. We set these to ensure that the capital stock
is non-decreasing in the closed capital autocracy, and let k0 = :05 and AM0 = 1:5.
Finally, we impose a bound on the autocrats ability to block technological progress. In the
11 This is a conservative estimate. An alternative would be to set the annual TFP growth rate to to match the
average annual growth rates of 3 percent over the period 1966-90, as reported in Table VII in Young (1995). However,
since we think of the starting date for our experiment as pre-1960 we opt for a more modest growth rate. Moreover,
we wish to study how policy choices a¤ect the evolution of the two types of autocracies and thus seek to minimize
the exogenous inuence on the economies.
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Table 1: Optimal policies in the capital and land autocracies.
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Capital autocracy Ot 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Mt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Land autocracy Ot 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ft 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mt .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1 .1
extreme case, we would let M 2 [0; 1], but to ensure that there is some growth in manufacturing
TFP even when the autocrat chooses to block new technology, we let M 2 [:1; 1]: The other two
policy variables O and F are dichotomous dummies capturing whether the autocrat allows for
trade in consumption goods and capital goods, respectively.
6.2 Results
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Figure 1: The relative price of agricultural goods in the two economies.
Table 1 displays the optimal policies from the benchmark experiment in the two types of autoc-
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Figure 2: The evolution of domestic capital (KD), foreign capital (KF), productivity of domestic
capital (AK) and e¤ective capital (K) in the two economies.
racies. To understand how these policies a¤ect the comparative advantage of the economies, it is
useful to simultaneously study the impact of these policies on the evolution of the relative price of
agricultural goods, displayed in Figure 1. The capitalist autocracy starts out with a comparative
disadvantage in manufacturing, so that the relative price of agricultural goods in this economy is
lower than the world-market price P A: Consequently, the capitalist autocrat initially maintains a
closed economy. As shown in Table 1, the autocrat keeps strengthening economic institutions and
sets M to one. The strong institutions promote technological progress and spur manufacturing
TFP growth, which gradually shifts the comparative advantage of this economy from agriculture to
manufacturing. Figure 1 suggests that in period 3, the relative price of agricultural goods has be-
come higher than the world-market price of these goods in the capital autocracy. Since the relative
price of agricultural goods is the inverse of the relative price of manufacturing goods, this suggests
that the relative price of manufacturing goods now has become lower than the world-market price
on these goods, i.e. the economy has developed a comparative advantage in manufacturing. This
makes the capitalist autocrat favourable to international trade, and as indicated in Table 1, he
sets O = 1 from period 3 onwards. The upper panel of Figure 2 displays the evolution of domes-
tic capital, the inow of foreign capital, the implied relative productivity of domestic capital and
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Figure 3: The allocation of labour to the agricultural (LA) and the manufacturing sector (LM ) in
the two economies.
the total e¤ective capital stock in this economy. The graphs suggest that the strong institutions
promote domestic capital accumulation by generating high returns to this factor. Turning to the
autocrats decision to allow for the inow of foreign capital, the results in Table 1 suggest that the
autocrat allows for such inows from period 9 onwards. The reason is that the potential spillovers
from such capital, as captured by  t in (29), is increasing in domestic capital. Once the autocrat
decides to set F = 1, the strong institutions and high returns to capital have made the economy
attractive to investors and foreign capital will ow into the country. As shown in Figure 2, the
inow of foreign capital boosts the total e¤ective capital stock through two channels: in addition to
having a direct e¤ect on K, it increases the relative productivity of domestic capital. Moreover, the
increase in the productivity of domestic capital will dampen some of the fall in returns generated by
a growing capital stock. This feature of the model is consistent with Hsieh (2002), who shows how
technological spillovers from the inow of foreign capital can prevent a fall in the returns to capital
and trigger further investment in the economy. The upper panel of Figure 3 displays the structural
transformation of this economy in terms of the allocation of labour across the two sectors. The
plot corroborates the analytical result (19), that in the rst two periods of autarky, employment
in the two sectors is constant, with the majority of the workforce employed in the manufacturing
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Figure 4: The evolution of GDP in the two economies (log scale).
sector. Once the economy has gained a comparative advantage in manufacturing and opens up to
trade, additional labour is drawn out of agriculture until most of the workforce is employed in the
manufacturing sector. This intersectoral reallocation of workers is consistent with ndings reported
in Young (1995). Finally, Figure 4 reports the evolution of GDP over time. The graph shows that
the capital autocracy grows at a steady but moderate pace for the rst 8 periods. Once foreign
capital is allowed into the country in period 9, however, the growth rate increases dramatically and
boosts GDP.
We next consider the evolution of the same economy, but under the rule of a landed autocrat.
Since the economy starts out with a comparative advantage in agriculture, the landed autocrat
opens up to trade immediately as the relative price of agriculture is lower than the relative world-
market price of these goods. The results in Table 1 indicate that the landed autocrat sets O = 1
from period 1 onwards and Figure 1 corroborates that PA < P A in this economy. Consistent with
Proposition 2, the results in Table 1 show that in this open environment, the landed autocrat
neglects economic institutions and sets M at the lower bound. The barriers to technological
progress that ensue cause manufacturing TFP to grow at a modest rate. The graph in Figure 1
reveals that this moderate growth rate causes the relative price of agricultural goods that would
prevail in autarky to increase somewhat over time, but the increase in manufacturing productivity
23
is not su¢ ciently large to overturn the comparative advantage in agriculture within the time frame
of the experiment. The lower panel of Figure 2 shows that the weak institutions that are sustained
in this open economy are detrimental to capital formation. The moderate growth in manufacturing
TFP generates low returns to capital and deters capital accumulation. Consistent with Proposition
3, it is never optimal for the landed autocrat to allow for foreign investment. Turning to the sectoral
allocation of labour in Figure 3, the lower panel shows that the moderate growth in manufacturing
TFP causes a gradual reallocation of some of the workforce from agriculture to manufacturing.
However, this structural transformation is much slower than in the capital autocracy and obtains
only because we set the lower bound on M > 0: Finally, the graph of GDP in Figure 4 conrms
that the weak institutions, moderate manufacturing TFP growth and failure to encourage capital
accumulation, constitute a path toward stagnation.
7 Discussion
Historical accounts suggest that the politically inuential group of any country tends to be in pos-
session of the economys natural resources. In traditionally agrarian economies, such as Argentina
in the 19th century, the political power of landowners is undisputed, see for instance Taylor (1997).
However, in more industrialized economies with a developed business sector, the elites instead tend
to be capitalists who derive prots from manufactures. South Korea is an example of an economy
where the powerful industrial families of the Jaebols constituted a politically inuential group from
the 1950s onwards, see for instance Kim (1976). The strong inuence of capitalists and bankers in
Shanghai under the Kuomintang regime in the late 1920s is also well documented, see for instance
Coble (1979).
The models predictions for the land autocracy are broadly consistent with the evolution of
the landed Latin American economies of the 19th century. These economies opened up to trade
at an early stage of development, focusing on exports of primary goods. Since the elites were
predominantly landowners in these economies, the model provides a rationale for why they favoured
globalization early on. The model is also consistent with the weak institutions that were a feature
of the Latin American landscape at the time and can help explain why the region failed to attract
foreign investors. In Argentina, the period prior to the Peronist rule as well as the period of military
rule in the 1980s, were characterized by liberal trade policies combined with poor institutional
settings. One caveat of our model is that it does not allow for the possibility of import substitution
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- an important chapter in the economic history of, for instance, Argentina. However, import
substitution appears to have been more important under the more democratic Perón government
than under both the preceding autocratic governments and the subsequent military rulers who were
inuenced by large landowners and favoured trade liberalization (Galliani and Torrens, 2011).12
Import-substitution policies are likely to have played an important role in the development of
several important economies in Latin America and elsewhere, but are beyond the scope of the
model and left for future research.
The models predictions for the capital autocracy help shed some light on some of the mecha-
nisms likely to have been at work in some East Asian economies in the postwar era, for example
South Korea and Taiwan. As discussed above, it is often believed that the autocratic governments
in these two countries were heavily inuenced by industrialists and the nancial industry. Rodrik
(1994) emphasizes that the governments in these economies prioritized industrial development and
sought to a¤ect comparative advantage by various policy measures. The GDP per capita levels in
these two countries were in 1960 on par with those in many sub-Saharan countries and well below
those of several large Latin American countries such as Brazil, Argentina or Mexico. During the
following three decades, however, the average growth rates of GDP per capita have averaged al-
most 7 percent. The cases of Taiwan and South Korea closely follow our predictions. In the 1960s,
domestic levels of investment rose sharply and many have argued that this rise in investment was
strongly connected to government policy. Rodrik (1994) writes:
... in the early 1960s and thereafter the Korean and Taiwanese governments managed
to engineer a signicant increase in the private return to capital. They did so not only by
removing a number of impediments to investment and establishing a sound investment
climate, but more importantly by alleviating a coordination failure which had blocked
economic take-o¤. (p. 2)
Importantly, however, export to GDP ratios remained relatively low throughout the 1960s but
rose sharply, in fact almost doubled, during the early 1970s. The 1970s and the 1980s were also
12 Several studies addressing the stagnation of Latin America identify the concentration of land ownership as
a possible culprit, see for instance Persson and Tabellini (1994), Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2000) and Adamopoulos
(2008). Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) show that inequality in land ownership may be detrimental to the emergence
of institutions promoting human capital and may therefore delay industrialization. On a similar note, Galiani et al.
(2008) study investments in public education in economies governed by landlords who do not engage in the production
of manufacturing goods. They argue that such economies fail to sustain strong educational institutions since the elites
do not benet from more educated workers.
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the decades when Taiwan started to receive large inows of foreign direct investment.13 These two
countries thus remained closed well into the 1960s, while the capital stock and competitiveness
grew. In time, however, the rulers in these countries found it favourable to enter world markets
and started to allow for foreign capital inows. This sequence of events: i) low levels of trade and
FDI but high levels of investment and TFP growth before the 1970s; ii) opening up to trade in
the early 1970s; and iii) substantial capital inows during the later 1970s and 1980s, follows our
models predictions very closely.
In sum, the most common views on the development of Argentina, South Korea and Taiwan
are largely consistent with our model. Building a model that is in line with the consensus view of
the factor endowments of the political elites in these countries, we demonstrate how the interaction
between institutional quality and trade in goods and capital is capable of generating sequences of
events in accordance with actual developments in these economies.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we present a specic-factor model of an economy where the ruling autocrat may
or may not strengthen technology-promoting institutions, open up to trade and allow for foreign
capital inows. We argue that the endowments of the political elites, and therefore the preferences
of the incumbent autocrat, can have far-reaching e¤ects on the economys long-run development.
We show that institutional quality and openness to trade in goods and capital interact in ways that
may help explain the heterogeneous performance of economies with imperfect political institutions.
We illustrate the workings of the model by simulating an economy that starts out with a
comparative disadvantage in manufacturing and vary the assumption about the nature of the
political elites. We nd that if the political elites are endowed with land, the autocrat is likely
to embrace globalization at an early stage. Opening up to trade, however, creates an adverse
incentive not to enforce institutional quality or allow for foreign capital inows, which discourages
capital accumulation. In such a land-oriented autocracy, allowing for trade and foreign capital
inows are substitute policies and due to the weak institutions that ensue, the economy is bound
to stagnate over time. We argue that the results for the land autocracy are broadly consistent
with the developments in Argentina during the pre-Perónist era and during the military rule of the
1980s.
13 Source: Statistics on Approved Overseas Chinese and Foreign Investment by Area, the Investment Commission,
Ministry of Economic A¤airs, Taiwan.
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If the political elites are instead endowed with capital, the autocrat is likely to maintain a closed
economy while strengthening economic institutions. The continuous strengthening of institutions
will lead to capital accumulation and a gradual shift towards a comparative advantage in manufac-
turing that eventually will make the autocrat favour international trade. The strong institutions
will make the economy attractive to foreign investors and productive capital will ow into the
country and spur the accumulation of e¤ective capital. In a capital autocracy, trade in goods and
capital are thus complementary policies that will lead to rapid growth and long-term development.
We argue that our results for the capital autocracy are consistent with actual developments in the
Tiger Economies of South Korea and Taiwan during the postwar period.
We have chosen to model an autocracy rather than a democracy since this simplies the political-
economy layer of the model. However, our results would obtain also in a democracy where the
political elites could form a political lobby and exert pressure on the democratic leader. The
results could thus be derived from a more general framework with imperfect political institutions.14
The model can be extended in several interesting dimensions. It would be interesting to study
the foundations of institutions in greater detail and to add microfoundations for rmsincentives
to invest in new technology. Another possibility would be to introduce a number of explicit trade
policies and let the ruling autocrat set tari¤s. In such a setting, import substitution could be
incorporated in a realistic fashion.
14 See for instance Levchenko (2012) for a framework with political lobbying or Galiani and Torrens (2011) for a
model of conict between the elites.
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Appendix A1: Utility Maximization
Denote the bequests given in terms of capital and land by BKt and BXt, respectively. The problem
facing the capitalist household is then:
max
CAt;CMt;BKt
U(CAt; CMt; BKt) =
 
CAtC
1 
Mt

B1 Kt
subject to
PAtCAt + PMtCMt + PBtBKt  IKt
The optimal choices of the capitalist household are:
CAt = 
IKt
PAt
;
CMt =  (1  ) IKt;
BKt = (1  ) IKt.
The problem facing the landed household is:
max
CAt;CMt;BXt
U(CAt; CMt; BXt) =
 
CAtC
1 
Mt

B1 Xt
subject to
PAtCAt + PMtCMt  IXt
BXt  xt = 1
where xt  Xt=NXt denotes land holdings per landowner. The optimal choices of the landed
household are:
CAt = 
IXt
PAt
;
CMt = (1  ) IXt;
BXt = 1.
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